Cruise Control

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AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2002 42 WO of the most powerful lessons learned from the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks
are that enemies dont al- ways attack in predictable ways, and
sometimes, the Defense Department
is looking for the wrong thing. The
ballistic missile threat is well-publi-
cized and has long been a factor in
Pentagon planning, but US vulner-
ability to cruise missiles has only
recently come to the forefront. Cruise missiles are considered ideal platforms for delivering Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction. The con-
cern is that enemies could, with little
difficulty, cobble missiles together
from parts readily available in the
commercial aviation market. These missiles could be hidden aboard container ships lying just off-
shore, then uncovered and launched
without warning. In a worst-case sce-
nario, they would carry biological or
chemical warheads and would sur-
prise US defenses. The threat has caught the eye of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rums-
feld. According to press reports,
Rumsfeld sent a classified memo to
the White House in July, calling at-
tention to the growing cruise missile
threat. Two months later, he went
public with a related warning by
noting that ballistic missiles can be
moved within range of key US tar-
gets by concealing them aboard in-
conspicuous commercial ships. At any given time, theres any number [of nondescript vessels] off
our coast, coming, going, Rumsfeld
explained at a Sept. 16 Pentagon
press briefing. Enemies on ships
equipped with a hidden Scudtype Devastating cruise missile attacks on US cities? The danger,
for years a back-burner issue, now gets high-level attention. Adam J. Hebert, Senior Editor Cruise Control launcher could simply erect it, fire
off a ballistic missile, put it down,
cover it up, he asserted. The modus
operandi for a cruise missile would
be similar. According to a report issued in July by the Congressional Research
Service, Cruise missiles have many
attributes that could make them at-
tractive to terrorists, who may use
them in ways that we currently cant
foresee. Cruise missiles are problematic because they are inexpensive, accu-
rate, easy to conceal, and hard to
detect and defeat. Intelligence and
military experts believe the threat of
a cruise missile attack on the United
States will continue to grow over the
next decade, as the technology needed
for these weapons proliferates and
potential enemies become more ap-
preciative of their capabilities. Especially troubling is the prospect of a large-scale cruise missile attack
that could overwhelm air defenses fo-
cused on finding and tracking larger,
high-flying aircraft. Limited cruise
missile defenses are in place, but many
missiles might get through in a mass
attack. Fortunately, intelligence as-
sessments predict such an attack is
unlikely in the next few years. There is some evidence that en- emies are pursuing advanced engine
and guidance technologies. These
components could be used to de-
velop longer-range, accurate cruise
missiles. Cruise Missile Club The CIAs latest unclassified threat assessment noted that 24 nations will
probably possess land attack cruise T AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2002 43 In his testimony, Tenet noted that Russian entities continue to pro-
vide ... technology and expertise
applicable to [chemical, biological,
and nuclear] ballistic and cruise mis-
sile projects. Russia appears to be
the first choice of proliferant states
seeking the most advanced technol-
ogy and training. The CRS list of threshold manu- facturers is a fairly benign group of
advanced industrial nations, but the
large number of nations that could
make the weapons, if they so de-
sired, illustrates that the technology
needed to begin a program is within
reach of much of the world. Two developments in recent years have made the cruise missile a more
viable weapon, experts say. In the past,
guidance and propulsion limitations
hindered the ability of most nations to
pursue effective land attack cruise
missiles, according to Steven J. Zaloga,
senior missile analyst with the Teal
Group defense consulting firm. But
now, these two big stumbling blocks
are being overcome. First, the Global Positioning Sys- tem has revolutionized flight con-
trol systems and is useful for both
cruise missile guidance and com-
mercial autopilot systems. The advent of [GPS] has probably done more to draw attention to cruise
missile proliferation than any other
event, noted Christopher Bolkcom,
CRS national defense analyst, at the
June Senate hearing on the cruise
missile threat. Todays standard GPS fense against cruise missiles is of-
ten an afterthought. Watch and Learn Ironically, it may have been the Pentagons use of cruise missiles that
legitimized them to adversaries. Tra-
ditionally, ballistic missile programs
were pursued throughout the Third
World partly as a sign of prestige.
Ballistic missiles were seen as sym-
bols of national power, despite the
limited effectiveness of the most
common, Scudtype systems. But analysts note that heavy and devastating use of Tomahawk land
attack cruise missiles and conven-
tional air launched cruise missiles,
beginning in the Persian Gulf War,
has not gone unnoticed. Although
the United States and its allies still
possess the best technology and best
missiles, advancing technology is
steadily lowering the threshold
needed to build effective cruise mis-
siles. Estimates vary depending on how cruise missiles are defined and mea-
sured, but according to DOD, there
are currently 19 nations manufactur-
ing cruise missiles and 12 exporting
them. Further, the Congressional
Research Service said 22 nations are
threshold manufacturers that could
begin programs in short order. Many of the closest US allies are among the current cruise missile
manufacturers, but the list also in-
cludes China, India, Iran, Iraq, North
Korea, and Russia. The utility of US cruise missiles, such as this Navy Tomahawk, may have
generated interest among potential adversaries. Nations that once focused on
acquiring ballistic missiles see an alternative. missiles by 2015. These will be ac-
quired via indigenous development,
acquisition, or modification of such
other systems as anti-ship cruise
missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles,
according to the CIAs national in-
telligence estimate. While these land
attack cruise missiles will have lim-
ited range, the CIA pointed out, they
will still possess sufficient range to
be forward deployed on air- or sea-
launch platforms. From a technical standpoint, cruise missiles are a better alternative for
launching from forward areas and
may therefore be seen as advanta-
geous for an attack on the United
States, the CIA assessment con-
cluded. The most plausible alternative for a forward-based launch would be a
covertly equipped commercial ves-
sel, it added. Sept. 11 brought to light lots of ways to deliver lethal damage to the
United States, Rumsfeld observed.
One methodthe potential use of a
remotely piloted helicopterwas
detailed in a manual found in an al
Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan in
the early days of Operation Endur-
ing Freedom. The low cost of acquiring cruise missiles is also a concern. An enemy
with $50 million to spend could buy
one or two advanced tactical fight-
ers, or 15 theater ballistic missiles
with three launchers, or 100 off-
the-shelf, ready-to-fire cruise mis-
siles, each potentially carrying a
Weapon of Mass Destruction war-
head, said a DOD report. Terrorists have shown favoritism toward low-cost, high-impact attacks,
a point not lost on CIA Director
George J. Tenet. In testimony before
the Senate last spring, Tenet noted
that the US increasingly faces en-
emies intent on causing pain and
suffering rather than defeating the
US militarily. According to DOD, land attack cruise missiles can be delivered by
land, sea, or air and are more accu-
rate and mobile than tactical ballis-
tic missilesbut with the same Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction payloads
available. Despite the looming problem that land attack cruise missiles pose, Sen.
Daniel K. Akaka (DHawaii), who
chairs the governmental affairs sub-
committee concerned with weapons
proliferation, said June 11 that de- Photo courtesy of General Dynamics AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2002 44 signals offer global accuracy of bet-
ter than 10 meters [33 feet]. Second, highly efficient turbofan engines designed for business-jet use
are becoming widely available. These
engines also make effective cruise
missile propulsion systems. Custom-
ers buying business-jet engines and
commercial GPS guidance systems
on the open market likely wont at-
tract much attention. Bolkcom described the problem as technology that hides in plain sight
because of the market for these dual-
use capabilities. Once missiles get into circulation, analysts caution, there may be very
little warning of an impending at-
tack. Even if the intelligence commu-
nity feels the threat is still some years
off, there are concerns the US may be
surprised by a cruise missile attack.
A September Pentagon briefing by a
senior defense official noted that there
have been repeated and significant
intelligence lapses in recent years. In addition to the Sept. 11 attacks, the US was surprised by how ad-
vanced the Iraqi nuclear program was
after the Gulf War, by the state of the
North Korean missile program when
a Taepo Dong missile overflew Ja-
pan in 1998, and by how advanced al
Qaedas WMD work was when dis-
covered in Afghanistan. Bolkcom testified that, in 1998, many were caught off guard when
the French sold an accurate, long-
range, potentially stealthy variant
of their Apache cruise missile, called Black Shahine, to the United Arab
Emirates. Experts call the Apache
missile the cruise missile weapon of
choice. There was concern in 1998 that the UAE sale would spur similar
sales of advanced Chinese and Rus-
sian cruise missiles, but so far this
has not occurred. Limited Countermeasures The Defense Department has lim- ited cruise missile defenses in place
today, with better capabilities on the
way. Sensor and air superiority air-
craft, terminal defenses, and com-
mand-and-control systems offer some
protection, though largely as a by-
product. The Air Forces most prominent cruise missile defenses reside in
Alaska, where 18 F-15Cs at Elmendorf
Air Force Base are equipped with
advanced radars capable of tracking
and targeting multiple incoming cruise
missiles. These Eagles were upgraded by Boeing in 2000 with Active Elec-
tronically Scanned Array radars. The
upgraded AESA radars, called the
APG-63(V)2, allow the F-15 to take
full advantage of its air-to-air mis-
siles and can simultaneously guide
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
Missiles to multiple targets. The Elmendorf F-15s are the first aircraft in the world to employ AESA
technology for combat. This capa-
bility will be the foundation for fu-
ture Air Force fighter upgrades. The radar upgrade also included improved Identification, Friend or
Foe capabilities, viewed as critical
for cruise missile defense. There is
little time to determine whether a
radar blip is a cruise missile or a
Cessnaand less room for error
when deciding whether to engage
the target. Both the F/A-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will employ advanced
AESA radars, and cruise missile iden-
tification and tracking is also one of
the missions envisioned for the Air
Forces upcoming multisensor com-
mand and control aircraft. Sensors, speed, and weapons make the F/A-22 the one fighter in the joint
air component optimized for cruise
missile defense, according to Rebecca
Grant, president of IRIS Independent
Research in Washington, D.C. The US ability to detect cruise missiles has benefitted from overall
air defense improvements in the wake
of 9/11. For example, analysts say
the improvements North American
Aerospace Defense Command made
to its radar coverage of the United
States by integrating radars and link-
ing to civil systems also enhanced
the ability to detect and track cruise
missiles. Additionally, DOD will be improv- ing cruise missile detection capa-
bilities through better sensors aboard
Air Force E-3 AWACS and Navy
E-2C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft
and a new Armyled program called
the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile
Defense Elevated Netted Sensor Sys-
tem, according to the CRS report. Systems integration is seen as an important stepping stone, stated the
report. Integrating air and missile
defense systems may have the great-
est payoff in designing and fielding
an effective cruise missile defense. The USAF Link-16 data link sys- tem for fighter aircraft will also be
helpful, because Link-16 will im-
prove tactical communications and
give pilots better information on
possible targets. The Army favors a system of teth- ered aerostats for the JLENS pro-
gram. They would provide low-cost,
over-the-horizon cruise missile de-
tection. Incoming missiles could be
detected at longer ranges by using
aerostats to elevate sensors to alti-
tudes up to 15,000 feet. JLENS would work in conjunction with fixed-wing aircraft and ground- France sold a stealthy variant of the Apache cruise missile, pictured here, to
the United Arab Emirates. Analysts say the Apache remains the likely weapon
of choice on the international market. AP photo by Michel Lipchitz AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2002 45 based systems. The Army expects a
full capability design by 2005. The JLENS program will fill a void in missile detection. According
to DOD, current systems that could
offer a cruise missile defense capa-
bility are not optimized to handle
that threat. The JLENS program office noted that the Air Force, while unques-
tionably the best air force in the
world against fixed-wing aerial
threats, possesses limited capability
against low-flying land attack cruise
missiles. That leaves the Armys
Patriot air defense missile system as
the primary terminal defense sys-
tem. However, when set up for bal-
listic missile defense, the Patriot
system cannot provide adequate
protection against low-flying threats,
according to the JLENS program
office. Land-based Patriot sensors
in their ballistic missile role have
limited ability to see and engage a
target approaching at an elevation of
100 meters [330 feet]. With JLENS
sensor data, the Patriot could increase
its effective battlespace by over 700
percent. Vulnerability to cruise missiles has long been recognized, but the prob-
lem may have been written off as
too hard, one official said. The
costexchange ratio was not in our
favor, he said, and to this day, if
you look for a budget line item for
cruise missile defense you wont
find one. So far, it is only sophis-
ticated systems such as the F/A-22
and Patriot that have been proposed
to counter cheap cruise missiles. Whether a Patriot missile costs $5 million or the desired $2 million
per copy, the figure compares unfa-
vorably with either a $200,000-per-
copy cruise missile or large satura-
tion attacks of $50,000-per-copy
modified airplanes, Dennis M.
Gormley, senior fellow with the In-
ternational Institute for Strategic
Studies, told Akakas Senate panel
in June. Negotiating Limits For that reason, some believe arms control measures offer the least ex-
pensive way to protect the United
States from advanced missilesby
keeping quality missiles out of en-
emy hands. This will be difficult,
given the commercial availability of
key components. One such measure, the Missile Technology Control Regime, an in-
formal export control agreement
among 33 nations, attempts to halt
the spread of advanced missile-re-
lated equipment. According to the
Arms Control Association, MTCR
is designed to stem the spread of
ballistic and cruise missiles capable
of delivering a 500-kilogram [1,100-
pound] payload 300 kilometers [186
miles] or more by setting export
guidelines and naming restricted
items. One of the problems with MTCR, however, is the ability to trade off
capabilities. Missiles that are tech-
nically OK for export can sometimes
be modifiedwith a boosted range
or payload to create a more useful
weapon. Nonetheless, MTCR has slowed proliferation of advanced ballistic
missiles, Gormley testified, with the
major consequence ... that the bal-
listic missile technology that has
spread thus far is largely derived
from 50-year-old Scud technology,
a derivative itself of the World War
II German V-2 missile program. Gormley argued that cruise mis- sile technology will inevitably con-
tinue to spread, but if MTCR can be
used to control land attack cruise
missile technology, US defenses can
conceivably keep pace with evolu-
tionary improvements. Vann Van Diepen, a State Depart- ment nonproliferation official testi-
fying at the same hearing, agreed it
is important to slow the spread of technology. Although there have been
well-publicized developments, such
as Iraqs conversion of Czech L-29
trainer aircraft into unmanned aerial
vehicles for probable CBW [Chemi-
cal and Biological Weapon] use,
export controls have helped deny ac-
cess to the best technology, he testi-
fied. Enemy acquisition of cruise
missiles is therefore slower, more
costly, and less effective and reli-
able. Van Diepen said the US is attempt- ing to stay ahead of the problem by
pushing for the necessary export
controls andwhen necessaryus-
ing interdiction, sanctions, or the
threat of military action to interrupt
transfers. Good intelligence is cen-
tral to nonproliferation, he said, and
these tactics have made cruise mis-
siles a less attractive option for our
adversaries to pursue. Tightening the export controls is problematic. Aerospace exports are
a major source of US industrial
strength, and controls on GPS sys-
tems, efficient jet engines, and flight
control systems would likely harm
legitimate users more than adversar-
ies. Akaka, who hosted the June hear-
ing, noted that similarities make it
difficult to inhibit cruise missile pro-
liferation without impacting the air-
craft industry. The unanswered question is whether commercial technology has already
let the cruise missile cat out of the
bag. Some analysts believe the threat
has now reached a critical point. s A handful of F-15s based in Alaska with advanced radars can track and
destroy cruise missiles. USAFs ability to defeat incoming missiles could
grow as the F/A-22, and later the F-35, come online.

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