Airborne outpost onboard Wedgetail'

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Dr Carlo Kopp W ith nearly sixty years of
global experience operating
Airborne Early Warning &
Control (AEW&C) platforms,
the operational technique
for using this vital capability
is truly mature. The newest addition to RAAF force structure, the Boeing/Northrop-Grumman Wedgetail AEW&C
aircraft, is expected to become operational later
this decade.
Wedgetail is without doubt strategically the most
important new capability being acquired for the
Australian Air Force. However, the RAAF has never
operated any system in this class, and will face a
steep learning curve in developing a new
operational paradigm for Wedgetail. Additionally,
this is the first of a new generation of Western
AEW&C aircraft equipped with modern 360-degree
azimuthal coverage Active Electronically Steered
Array (AESA) radars.
The importance of Wedgetail cannot be
overstated, as regional operators move to field a
wide range of AEW&C types. India has ordered the
Elta/Beriev A-50I with a variant of the Phalcon L-
band AESA radar, and is apt to field a second tier
system based on the EMB-145. China is flight
testing a very similar A-50 derived system.
Malaysia and South Korea are shopping for a mid range system, while Taiwan and Japan already
operate AEW&C aircraft. By 2010 wealthier regional
nations without AEW&C will be the exception rather
than the rule.
The broader issues in introducing a new AEW&C
capability are manifold. Not only must the aircraft
be introduced into service, training systems
developed, support infrastructure built, software
support systems made to work, but also a doctrinal
model must be created covering the strategic,
operational and tactical usage of the aircraft. This
will include the integration of technique with
existing force structure elements such as the
fighter and strike assets Air Combat Group. Specific
flying technique, airborne offensive and defensive
tactics, along with supporting fighter tactics will
need to be developed. None of this is trivial by any
measure.
Perhaps the best starting point for a discussion of
these issues is the US Air Force Doctrine Document
AFDD 2-5.2 on Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Operations, the upper level guide
to how the US employs its fleet of E-3C AWACS
aircraft - and other intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems. As the biggest and
most experienced operator of AEW&C capabilities,
the US Air Force sets the global benchmark in this
game. US doctrine emphasises a number of key
issues. 2 DefenceTODAY magazine Airborne
outpost
onboard
Wedgetail Wedgetail includes the most
comprehensive defensive suite on
any AEW&C aircraft, including
Directed IR Countermeasures, laser
warning and expendables (RAAF). The first is that the aim of all ISR operations,
including AEW&C, is achieving and sustaining
information superiority over an opponent. The
opponent must always be at a disadvantage in
understanding the bigger picture, and the more
localised picture, in any area of operations. This is
achieved by two means: the first being the
gathering and analysis of information, primarily
through ISR systems; the second being the
offensive use of Electronic Combat systems to
disrupt and degrade the opponents ability to gather
and analyse information. In air operations,
Wedgetail provides the RAAF with a key
component of this ISR architecture.
The process central to any ISR system, including
Wedgetail, is the ISR cycle, a repeated loop in
which information is collected, analysed, disseminated and evaluated for use. In an AEW&C
system this amounts to continuous surveillance of
an area of interest, analysis of the situation, and
distribution of the information product to users
such as patrolling fighter aircraft or surface air
defences.
As a system for executing an ISR cycle, Wedgetail
provides a long-range radar, an Electronic Support
Measures system for passively detecting hostile
radar emitters, an IFF system for tracking friendly
aircraft, a JTIDS/Link-16 master terminal for
combat identification and distribution of information to friendly assets, and a comprehensive voice communications suite, in
addition to an onboard team of operators to
manage and execute the cycle.
Considering Wedgetail in the abstract sense (as
an ISR system) is important, as it allows us to see
the system as a component in a networked force,
providing key information gathering, analysis and
distribution capabilities, as well as an onsite
command capability.
US doctrine identifies three key areas in which
AEW&C is employed - air defence, strike control
and maritime operations.
In air defence operations AEW&C systems provide
early warning of inbound threats, identification
between friendly, neutral and hostile aircraft, and
command and control of friendly combat aircraft.
Air sovereignty operations, in which hostile aircraft
are dissuaded from entering defended airspace,
are a variation on this theme, more so under
circumstances where conflict is impending and
intruding aircraft may be seeking openings for an
initial attack.
Strike control operations expand on the basic
model of air defence operations, by adding the
battle management of strike aircraft packages and
their escorts, communications relay capability into
hostile airspace, and the capability to manage
combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations. Maritime operations amount to over-water
execution of air defence and strike control
operations, providing surface warships with an ISR
umbrella and situational awareness in often
complex environments. The ability of an AEW&C
aircraft to provide early warning against anti-ship
cruise missile firing aircraft, and inbound cruise
missiles, is an absolutely critical function in
maritime air and missile defence operations.
Since the 1960s US AEW&C aircraft have also
provided the critical capability to manage aerial
refuelling operations, marshalling tankers and
receiver aircraft in time and space.
For Australia, an important role for Wedgetail will
be patrolling the northern maritime approaches in
support of civil authorities, detecting and tracking
aircraft and ships. While we have yet to see
terrorists trying to cross the sea-air gap with
hijacked aircraft or ships, such scenarios are
possible and must be counted as another role for
AEW&C aircraft.
In coming years the RAAF will have to develop
specific doctrine and technique to cover all of these
areas, exploiting US and EU experience and
adapting it to unique Australian constraints, and
optimise the doctrine to make use of the unique
capabilities of Wedgetails MESA radar. DefenceTODAY magazine 3 Air Defence Operations While AEW&C aircraft can be applied across a
broad spectrum of operational environments, a
common thread relates to the operational
techniques used in basic air defence operations,
intended to support the interception of hostile
aircraft.
The classical technique for such operations sees
the AEW&C aircraft launched and flown on a cruise
climb profile to a specific station where the aircraft
assumes a racetrack pattern patrol orbit. For a
turbofan design like Wedgetail the orbit will be at
altitudes typically between 30,000 ft and 40,000 ft,
subject to fuel weight and required detection range.
Given the curvature of the earth, the higher the
orbit, the better the detection and tracking range
against low flying targets.
On station endurance is a function of the distance
between the patrol station and the airfield from
which the AEW&C aircraft operates, and the host
airframe design. While aerial refuelling can add
considerable endurance, practical limits will be
imposed by crew endurance and consumables
such as engine lubricants.
On station flying technique with conventional
rotating mechanically steered antennas is to fly
very lazy or flat turns at the ends of the orbit
pattern, to minimise the airframe roll angle and
thus minimise impairments to radar coverage while
reversing orbit direction.
Wedgetails MESA radar provides best range and
angular resolution performance when using the
side looking slab arrays, so there will be some
degradation in track quality while a target is being
viewed over the nose or tail, using the Top hat array
antenna. Not unlike conventional AEW&C systems,
Wedgetail technique will aim to minimise time
spent in turns.
AEW&C operational planning typically orients the
racetrack pattern so that the axis of the orbit is
normal to the threat sector, the range of headings
between which a threat is expected to appear. The
greater the distance of the orbit from an opponents
airfields, typically the narrower the threat sector;
the greater the combat radius of opposing aircraft,
the wider the threat sector.
The relationship between the distance between the
AEW&C aircraft and the initial threat detection point
is critical in terms of what azimuthal coverage the
system needs to provide. For instance, submarine-
launched cruise missiles dictate full 360-degree
coverage continuously as they may appear at any
azimuth or distance.
Once an orbit is established, the AEW&C system
will go active to support fighter patrols in the area
and other assets such as tankers supporting the
fighters and AEW&C aircraft. Conventional technique for defensive counter-air operations
where the AEW&C aircraft is used to block
incoming strike, reconnaissance or fighter sweep
sorties is to position the fighters in Combat Air
Patrol (CAP) orbits between the AEW&C aircraft and
the inbound threat. A technique used often by the
US is to align the axis of the CAP orbit with the
threat, and position a pair of fighters at opposite
ends of the orbit, so one fighter nearly always has
its radar pointed at the threat axis.
How and where the AEW&C system is positioned is
thus critically dependent upon the scenario in
question. At one extreme is the high density Cold
War Euro-theatre air battle model, replicated over
Iraq in 1991, where multiple AEW&C systems are
put up to form an unbroken barrier across the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) with continuous
24/7 coverage. Fighters are then tasked either as
ground alert interceptors or airborne CAPs, the
latter available to respond immediately to inbound
threats. If the incoming raid is visibly a large one,
then additional ground alert fighters are launched
to provide a second and third echelon of
interceptors to engage those threats that got past
the airborne CAPs. For any high-density environment of this kind, exhaustion of fighter
missile payload is a genuine issue, as fuel
expenditure can be offset with adequate tanking
capacity.
It has been customary for decades to attach
fighters to AEW&C aircraft as High Value Asset
Protection CAPs (HVAPCAP). This practice will not
vanish as the central importance of the AEW&C
platform remains - both as an ISR system and
battle management asset.
Geographical depth is always an advantage in air
defence operations, an implicit by-product of the
geometrical constraints in AEW&C coverage. Where
there is enough distance between the airfields
hosting opposing aircraft, and good early warning
of hostile aircraft launches, then AEW&C aircraft
and fighter/tanker packages can be launched
reactively. This is the model used by the US Air
Force to cover Alaskan approaches during the latter
Cold War, where E-3 AWACS, F-15C and KC-135
packages were reactively launched to fend off
probes by Soviet long-range bombers, such as
Bears, Backfires and Blackjacks.
This model is viable for Australian operations in the
deep north where the threat is a combat aircraft
with relatively short ranging weapons, as JORN
early warning of inbound aircraft can be exploited
to trigger the launch of an AEW&C aircraft and
fighter/tanker package. The package would then be
best positioned to stop the inbound hostiles within
the sea-air gap before they can launch their
weapons. The game then distils down to a race
between the outbound AEW&C/fighter/tanker
package and the inbound hostiles to first get to the
volume of airspace from which weapons can be
launched.
The reactive launch model becomes increasingly
ineffective as the range of opposing weapons
increases, as it may not be feasible to effect
intercepts before the inbound hostiles launch. The
proliferation of air-launched cruise missiles
presents this environment, as the most likely one
Australia will face post 2010.
In an environment where cruise missiles with
ranges well in excess of 250 NMI are used, the time
penalties associated with reactive launch, climb to
altitude and cruise to station can compromise the
situation. In such environments the AEW&C/fighter/tanker package must be airborne
continuously, although the distance to station can
be traded to an extent. It is cheaper and easier to
orbit an AEW&C/fighter/tanker package at 200 NMI
offshore than at 400 NMI. 4 DefenceTODAY magazine Cruise Missile Defence The biggest single strategic capability issue
Australia will face post-2010 is in providing
robust defences against cruise missiles, which
are rapidly emerging as the weapon of choice in
the Asia-Pacific-Indian region. With supersonic
and subsonic cruise missiles being developed
regionally, licenced or bought from Russia,
cruise missiles are readily available and permit
regional air forces to launch strikes without
having to grapple with more skilled Western
fighter pilots in air combat. The German
bombardment of Britain with V-1 cruise missiles
in 1944 is the case study: where air superiority
is expensive to win, then use large numbers of
cheap cruise missiles.
Defending against air-launched cruise missiles
amounts to a special case of conventional air
defence operations, with the caveat that
inbound aircraft carrying cruise missiles should
always be intercepted before they launch their
weapons. It is always easier to intercept an
aircraft with a large radar signature than it is to
hunt down the multiplicity of cruise missiles
launched, each with a small radar signature. In
performing system analysis on air intercepts,
typically two missiles must be budgeted for
each target, to ensure a high kill probability.
Killing a dozen cruise missiles requires two
dozen air-to-air missiles versus a pair to kill the
launch vehicle.
Wedgetail system is well suited to cruise
missile defence operations since the AESA
permits modes in which more rapid scans of
specific sectors can be performed, increasing
the probability of detecting cruise missile class
targets. The high peak power of the MESA is
also suited to this regime.
Another factor favouring the RAAF in defending
against air-launched cruise missiles is the depth
of the sea-air gap, which provides time to
repeatedly sweep areas for subsonic cruise
missiles. A 450 KTAS speed weapon with 500
NMI max range provides for about an hour to
intercept it (numbers of AEW&C aircraft and
fighter missile payloads permitting).
Submarine launched cruise missiles are more
problematic since they can be launched from
positions much closer to the intended target. If a
submarine commander is prepared to risk a
close approach, then as little as minutes may be
available to stop the missile. Where such a risk
exists, an AEW&C platform - or any aircraft with
a surveillance radar capable of tracking a cruise
missile - must be positioned so that the target of
the cruise missile attack is under the footprint of
the radar.
In perspective, submarine launched cruise
missiles are harder to defend against, but due to
the slow transit speeds and limited payloads of
regional diesel-electric boats they present a
lesser strategic risk than air-launched missiles.
The latter can be delivered to their launch points
at 450 KTAS, and once launched the aircraft
may cycle back to its base for a reload and
another sortie, with sortie rates limited only by
missile stocks, and numbers of aircrew and
aircraft. Aerial refuelling is vital to extending the
on-station endurance of AEW&C aircraft.
(US Air Force) Maritime Air Defence AEW&C aircraft have been central to maritime air defence for decades, with the
US Navy decades ago operating land and carrier based systems, and all major
navies today operating the latter. With the plethora of Russian, clone Russian and
indigenous cruise missiles in the Asia-Pacific-Indian region, cruise missile
defence is central to the viability of any surface warship, and commercial
shipping in wartime.
The operational issues are essentially the same as observed with conventional
air defence and cruise missile defence, with the important caveat that warships
are far less forgiving of cruise missile hits than are most land based targets.
While Air Warfare Destroyers will provide a good capability to engage high and
medium altitude targets at long ranges, the geometry of cruise missile attacks
using sea skimming supersonic missiles presents genuine problems for
defending naval surface units.
Wedgetail provides a land based option to support the RAN, with the caveat that
distances to station will be the critical factor in viability, as continuous 24/7 orbits
over naval task forces or groups will be essential where a risk of attack exists.
Since Australia is opting out of significant long-range strike capabilities in the future, the
option of defeating an opposing anti-ship cruise missile firing strike force by attacking its
airfields will not be a credible option post-2010.
The ability to provide Wedgetail and fighter support for naval forces operating at 1,000 NMI
or greater distances from the continent will be contingent not only on numbers of Wedgetail
and fighter aircraft, but critically on the number of tankers available. DefenceTODAY magazine 5 Air defence operations against combat aircraft and cruise missiles will present genuine challenges
for the RAAF, with a limited number of AEW&C aircraft, and a small tanker force. The geographical
constraints for potential high value targets are depicted in this chart (Author). Strike Control The use of AEW&C aircraft for battle
management of air strike operations is a
technique practised since the 1950s, and was
central to operations in Southeast Asia, and
every major air campaign since.
In many respects the basic constraints applied
differ little from what we observe in air
defence operations, with the important caveat
that the AEW&C aircraft must be positioned
close enough to the FEBA to reliably surveil
airspace which is being penetrated by strike
packages and their fighter escorts. Fighters
tasked with offensive sweeps, loose escort or
close escort are then directed by the AEW&C
system against defending fighters, and
penetrating strike aircraft are provided with
continuously updated location information on
hostile interceptors.
The principal issue with all strike control
operations is the exposure of the AEW&C
aircraft to opposing defences, be these
fighters or long-range Surface Air Missiles.
While driving the AEW&C orbit closer to the
FEBA provides a deeper look into enemy
airspace, it also puts the aircraft closer to
opposing defences.
While many of the regional environments the
RAAF will have to plan around are littoral, and
thus not requiring significant depth for strike
operations, often this terrain is mountainous,
providing large areas of concealment in radar
shadow if the AEW&C aircraft is standing off at
a large range. This provides opportunities for
mobile long-range SAM systems, and high
performance fighter aircraft to approach
undetected to distances where they would
otherwise be detected over flat terrain or
ocean. Perhaps the best case study was Israeli
fighter operations against the Syrians in 1982,
exploiting the blind zone created by
mountainous terrain along the Lebanon-Syria
border.
Strike control operations are thus potentially
the most risky environments in which an
AEW&C aircraft can be operated. AEW&C Survivability in Combat Modern wars, especially air wars, can be described as information centric, in
that, the ability to apply coordinated military force rapidly and precisely hinges
on the ability to achieve information superiority, which amounts to having a
superior picture of the battlespace relative to an opponent. This is achieved by
having airborne ISR systems, including AEW&C, and the electronic combat and
offensive capabilities to deny the use of such systems to an opponent. NCW
for all of its merit is little more than providing fast digital connections between
the ISR systems and combat elements - take away the ISR systems in a
networked force and the system collapses.
The reality of any high intensity air wars fought in the 21st Century is that air
superiority can only be achieved through prior information superiority. In such
an environment ISR systems, especially AEW&C aircraft, and electronic
combat systems, such as jamming aircraft, become the highest priority targets
in an air battle. The player who can kill the opponents AEW&C and jamming
aircraft first, or drive them out of the battlespace, achieves information
superiority and thereafter, air superiority, winning the battle.
The Soviets recognised this reality in 1982, after the Israelis using E-2C
AEW&C aircraft and Boeing 707 standoff jammers completely routed Syrian
forces in the battle for Lebanon. The message was reinforced in 1991, when
the US Air Force and Navy repeated this success against the much stronger
Iraqi air defence system.
The result of these experiences was a concerted effort, through the 1980s and
continued during the early 1990s, to devise weapons capable of defeating
airborne ISR platforms, especially AEW&C aircraft, and airborne standoff
jamming aircraft such as the EF-111A Raven and EA-6B Prowler.
The design aims of the Antey S-300V/VM and later variants of the Almaz S-
300PMU SAM systems included attacking ISR aircraft and airborne jammers
from very long ranges. The model centres on the idea of driving highly mobile
S-300V/VM or S-300PMU-2/S-400 missile batteries as close to the FEBA as
possible, in radar/radio silence, and then sniping at ISR aircraft and airborne
jammers with long-range missile shots from concealed positions. The stated
role of the 9M82 Giant (S-300V/SA-12a) SAM and newer long-range missiles
in the S-300PMU-2 Favorit and S-400 suites is exactly this. With ranges
against high flying targets between 100 and 200 NMI, this class of long-range
SAM presents a genuine risk to an AEW&C platform. Moreover, trading an S-
300V, S-300PMU-2 or S-400 battery for an AEW&C aircraft in battle is typically
worthwhile, in dollars and combat effect. It is worth observing that China
operates at least 12 batteries of S-300PMU SAMs, and is expected to acquire
the S-400. Vietnam has ordered the S-300PMU-2, while Indonesia is claimed
to have also sought these missiles.
Soviet thinking on achieving information superiority was not confined to using
long-range SAMs. One of the intended roles of later variants of the MiG-25
Foxbat, and the MiG-31 Foxhound, was to fly high altitude high-speed dashes
to take shots at NATO ISR aircraft, especially the E-3 AWACS. This is inherently
expensive in combat losses, as multiple Foxhounds or Foxbats would have to
be traded for each AWACS, JSTARS, Rivet Joint or Raven killed. By the early
1990s Soviet thinking shifted to the use of very long-range BVR AAMs,
allowing the fighter - and aircrew - to survive most attacks and be reused. The
result was the emergence of the KS-172 and R-37 missiles during the early
1990s, and reported adaptations of the Kh-31 missile. These missiles are now
appearing in Asia, with India collaborating on the R-172 and China claimed to
have licenced the Kh-31.
The evolution of specialised counter-ISR weapons is a direct consequence of
Western information superiority and should be seen as such.
The big issue for Australia in the longer term is developing a fighter force, and
operational doctrine, which permits the Wedgetail force to survive in an
environment where arbitrary regional nations may be operating weapons like
the S-300PMU-2/S-400, R-37, R-172 and Kh-31 - or have the option of
fielding such weapons with a warning time of as little as months. The US Air
Force approach has centred on using the F/A-22A to kill the S-300PMU-2/S-
400, Sukhoi fighters carrying BVR missiles such as the R-172, R-37 or Kh-31,
and opposing ISR and jamming platforms. 6 DefenceTODAY magazine The MESA phased array carried by Wedgetail is the most
advanced AEW&C radar in existence. Phased arrays have
the important capability of manipulating beam direction and
shape very quickly, allowing complex search modes in which
the system spends more time searching specific sectors to
improve detection and tracking performance (Author). The importance of information superiority has been widely
recognised in Asia, with India and China both aiming to field
variants of the Beriev A-50 before the end of the decade.
Smaller nations such as Malaysia and South Korea have
been evaluating types for purchase (Author).

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