Looking to the future: The next 50 years

T H E 2 0 0 4 A N S Annual Meeting, held in Pittsburgh, included the of-
ficial observance of the American Nuclear Societys 50th anniversary. The
2005 Annual Meeting, held June 59 in
San Diego, took a logical next step by
adopting the theme, The next 50 years:
Creating opportunities. Developments in
the industry since the Pittsburgh meeting
seem to show an increased likelihood that
new power reactors may be built in the
United States during the next decade, and
speakers at a number of sessions in San
Diego addressed not only how to create
such opportunities, but what to do once the
opportunities arrive. The opening plenary session indicated that some opportunities for nuclear power
are coming from the top levels of political
leadership. Jeffrey Clay Sell, sworn in on
March 21 as deputy secretary of energy,
told the attendees that nuclear power is the
cornerstone of the Bush administrations
energy policy. Later, in response to a ques-
tion from the audience, he described Presi-
dent Bush as the most pronuclear president
since Eisenhower, and maybe more so than
Eisenhower. Sell described in detail the risk indemni- cation insurance plan proposed by Bush in
late April (NN, June 2005, p. 25). According
to Sell, owners of the rst two new power
reactors of each type (AP1000, ESBWR,
etc.) would be eligible to obtain insurance
to compensate for half of the cost of serious
project delays from prolonged hearings, up
to $500 million per reactor. Under the plan,
premiums would be waived for reactors or-
dered before the end of 2008. Sell noted,
however, that the administration has pro-
posed this insurance to replace the various
tax incentives being considered for new re-
actors in congressional deliberations on the
energy bill, not in addition to them. To underscore the importance of reviv- ing nuclear power, not just in the United
States but worldwide, Sell cited a variety
of demand growth projections. He said that
the International Energy Agency foresees
a 60 percent growth in world energy de-
mand over the next 25 years, and that in
2030 there would still be 1.6 billion people
in the world without electricity, according to USA Today. Because nuclear power al-
ready exists, he said, it can be seen as a
strong possibility to provide larger output,
without greenhouse gas emissions, to meet
future demandmore so than hydrogen,
wind, solar, and carbon-sequestered coal,
which either have inherent limits or are not
yet proven to be practical. Sell predicted
that in the next 25 to 50 years, power reac-
tors will become unremarkable and non-
controversial. NRCs role Peter Lyons, appointed by Bush earlier this year to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, spoke on the agencys role in fu-
ture nuclear energy utilization. He said that
while the NRCs mission is to regulate nu-
clear applications, not to promote them, he believes that the NRC should encourage
fuel diversity by ensuring the availability of
nuclear power. He stated that the United
States would lose its technical capabilities in nuclear energy
within 20 years with-
out boosts in person-
nel and infrastructure
in the near term. Lyons summa- rized the areas in
which the NRC is in-
volved with maxi-
mizing the potential
of existing reactors
(through license re- newal and power uprates) and setting the
stage for the possibility of new reactor or-
ders (through ongoing activities in early site Lyons A N S A N N U A L M E E T I N G Looking to the future: The next 50 years Meeting session coverage: Optimistic outlook for nuclear power continues Industry edges closer to reactor licensing
The nonproliferation challenge in Iran
Technology for proliferation- resistant fuels Personnel turnover and knowledge capture Alaska town studies small power reactor
Robotics for remote and hazardous environments NRCs new engineering inspections August 2005 N U C L E A R N E W S 41 Meetings permits [ESP] and reactor design certica-
tion, and readiness for construction/operat-
ing license [COL] applications). His slides
illustrating the NRCs process for reviewing
license applications drew attention to one
area of potential regulatory uncertainty.
While the NRC has set target time frames
for reviews of ESP, design certication, and
COL applications, it has set no such targets
for reviews of the inspections, tests, analy-
ses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) that
must be completed to verify that a reactor
has been built in compliance with its COL.
To some extent, this is because the owner
of the reactor conducts the ITAAC, on
whatever schedule it chooses, and only later
would the NRC review them. Lyons listed a number of other issues that need to be addressed, to differing degrees,
by the industry and the NRC. These include
materials (such as in vessel head corrosion),
the potential for clogging in pressurized wa-
ter reactor containment sumps, the loss of
experience as aging workers retire, the need
to maintain safe operation, and the reliabil-
ity of the nations electricity grid. The transformation of INL Adm. John Grossenbacher (USN Ret.), director of the Idaho National Laboratory,
spoke on the effort to transform what had
been the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory into a world-
class, multiprogram facility for advanced
reactor and fuel cycle development. He
said that getting to that point would require
overcoming a number of challenges, in-
cluding the continuing cleanup of areas on
the large tract of land in eastern Idaho,
where radioactive materials had been
buried with little or no connement, to pre- vent their migration into the environment.
Grossenbacher referred to this legacy as the
sites sins of the past; under the new con-
tractor arrangements at INL, cleanup activ-
ities will be performed by contractors other
than those operating the laboratory. Grossenbacher spoke of the need for cul- ture change at the Idaho facility, citing the differing and sometimes conflicting cul-
tures among scientists, engineers, and reac-
tor operations personnel. As for making
INL a focus of a nuclear renaissance
through the development of Generation IV
reactors and fuel cycles, he said, If were
waiting for a better time . . . I dont know
what were waiting for. Incentives needed Andrew White, president and chief exec- utive officer of General Electric Nuclear
Energy, said he is lucky to be in charge of
GEs reactor business at a time when the
United States appears to be heading for new
nuclear power and GEs top management is
taking a more pronuclear stance. White, as
other GE nuclear ofcials on recent occasions
have done, stated plainly that former GE
chief Jack Welch had not been especially
positive about nuclear power as a major GE
enterprise. Contrary to what Sell had said earlier, White said he thinks incentives are needed to encourage the con-
struction of the first
few new reactors in
the United States. As
for his companys
newest contribution
to the potential new
era of nuclear power,
White said that GE
plans to submit its
application for the
certification of its ESBWR advanced boiling water reactor de-
sign to the NRC this summer. Overcoming barriers Former NRC Chairman Richard Meserve, now president of the
Carnegie Institution,
agreed with White
on incentives, noting
that the Secretary of
Energy Advisory
Board had said that
the federal govern-
ment should provide
$250 million for the
rst two new reac-
tors. He also called
for the renewal of the
Price-Anderson Act
and echoed White
and Lyons on the
need for the nuclear
eld to attract new
people to ll in for those nearing retirement. But in response to
earlier speakers who cited polls showing as
much as 70 percent backing for new reac-
tors, Meserve said that he thinks such pub-
lic support for nuclear is soft and would
drop sharply if there were a serious incident
at an operating reactor. Meserve foresaw a number of barriers to the ordering of new
reactors: unknowns
in the never-used as-
pects of the licensing
regime in 10 CFR
Part 52, unknowns in
ITAAC and the nal
approval for reactor
startup, the coordina-
tion of regulations
and licensing among
several countries, and the enforcement of the International
Atomic Energy Agencys additional proto-
col to bolster nonproliferation. In closing,
however, Meserve said that he believes the
barriers can be overcome. The nal speaker at the opening plenary session was Nobel Prize winner Samuel
Ting, a professor of physics at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. Because
his presentation on the use of superconduct-
ing magnets in physics and space explo-
ration effectively started off the embedded
Space Nuclear Conference 2005 (SNC 05),
it is covered in the separate report on SNC
05 that begins on page 55. Nuclear Power 2010 With each passing meeting, the sessions devoted to the possibility of new reactor or-
ders in the United States offer more precise
details about the federal governments
plans and funding and the nuclear indus-
trys expectations and schedules. The ses-
sion at the San Diego meeting was devoted
specically to Nuclear Power 2010, the De-
partment of Energys program to share
costs with industry on early site permits
(ESP), reactor design certication, and con-
struction/operating license (COL) applica-
tions, so it did not include explorations be-
ing done by utilities without DOE support,
such as those being carried out separately
by Duke Power Company and Southern
Nuclear Operating Company. Tom Miller, of the Department of En- ergys Office of Nuclear Energy, Science
and Technology, gave a status report on
Nuclear Power 2010, of which he is the
program director. He said that the program
has provided support for the licensing
demonstration projects of NuStart and Do-
minion Energy, the feasibility study for
possible construction of an advanced boil-
ing water reactor at the Tennessee Valley
Authoritys (TVA) Bellefonte site, scoping
studies for the use of federally owned sites
for power reactor construction, and a study
of siting prospects in Texas (requested by
the Texas Institute for the Advancement of
Chemical Technology). I cant relay how
much interest there is in new plants in this
country, said Miller, calling the current
situation a complete turnaround from two
years ago. Miller noted that the process still faces a number of challenges. Deployment issues Meserve White 42 N U C L E A R N E W S August 2005 As for making INL a focus of a nuclear renaissance through the development of Generation IV reactors and fuel cycles, [Grossenbacher] said,If were waiting for a better time . . . I dont know what were waiting for. include regulatory uncertainty (because the
Nuclear Regulatory Commissions new li-
censing process in 10 CFR Part 52 has
never been used), nancial uncertainty (be-
cause potential investors are unsure of the
actual costs of bringing new reactors to
completion), and such long-standing con-
cerns as high-level waste disposal and ac-
cident indemnication. Challenges for the
industry include the formation of a quali-
ed supply chain (including the provision
of commodities such as concrete and rebar),
the availability of personnel in all areas
(technical, craft, and engineering), advance-
ments in engineering and construction man-
agement to complete a project in about four
years, and the integration of inspections,
tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria
(ITAAC) into the construction process and
schedule. NuStart activities Dan Keuter, vice president of nuclear business development at Entergy Nuclear,
summarized the activities of the NuStart
consortium, which includes the owners of
more than half of the nations operating re-
actors, as well as the two most established
reactor vendors. He said that there were jit-
ters on Wall Street when Entergy bought
Pilgrim in 1999, marking the rst outright
sale of an operating reactor, but after a
while things calmed down. Keuter said he
thinks the same will happen when new re-
actors are ordered: perhaps some early tur-
moil in the investment community, but then
steady growth in confidence as new reac-
tors enter service. According to Keuter, NuStart itself would not build reactors, but a separate or-
ganization of one or more NuStart members
would use the licenses issued by the NRC to
build reactors. He spoke of the announce-
ment in May of six candidate sites (NN,
June 2005, p. 18), which will be winnowed
down to two in September, for which Nu-
Start will seek licenses. He said that the ex-
clusion of Exelons Clinton site from the
group of six came at Exelons request and
did not indicate anything wrong with the
site. (Exelon later announced that it with-
held Clinton because it did not want new re-
actors there to be shared by NuStart; see
NN, July 2005, p. 11.) Keuter then listed the
other major milestones on the schedule:
August 2006, request for proposals issued
for constructors; July 2007, selections made
from returned proposals; August 2007,
COL application for AP1000; December
2007, COL application for ESBWR; 2008,
application to the DOE for shared funding
on final plant design; and in 2010, Keuter
said, he thinks it is probable that some
NuStart members will take the COLs and
be ready for potential construction. Keuter also showed what NuStart be- lieves to be the best way to address the is-
sue of rst-of-a-kind costs. He said that an 80 percent federal loan guarantee would
have the same effect on the federal budget
as $18/MWh, eight-year production tax
credits, and less than half the effect of a 20
percent construction investment tax credit,
but would meet more of the capital costs
than any other option, would cover far more
of the licensing and construction risk,
would have the lowest dilution of earnings,
and would be the only approach that helps
obtain debt nancing. More focus, less commitment Eugene Grecheck, vice president of nu- clear support ser-
vices at Dominion
Energy, spoke next,
saying that his com-
panys involvement
in Nuclear Power
2010 is more fo-
cused than NuStarts
and thus far does not
entail as much com-
mitment. He said
that Dominion plans
to begin writing its
COL application in September and have it
nished two years later. The ESP for North
Anna is expected in June 2006. Dominion
will not decide on whether to seek a license,
however, until that deadline in September
2007. Grecheck said that Dominion would then apply for a COL if all nancials are in place
(government incentives, what he called
commercial risk allocation structures,
cost estimates, power demand), if the NRC
situation is clear (ESP in hand, ESBWR de-
sign certication at least at the point where
outstanding technical issues are known), if
there is local, state, and federal support, and
if the industry is in fact able to build new
reactors. Steve Hucik, general manager of nuclear plant projects with GE Nuclear Energy, re-
ported on two developments at his com-
pany, both expected during August: the
completion of the Bellefonte feasibility
study and the submission of the ESBWR
design certication application. The former,
which is based on the already certified
ABWR, was still not ready for release, but
Hucik said that GE has already had discus-
sions with the TVA and the DOE on possi-
ble follow-on work to set the stage for a
COL application. GE is referencing the
ABWR as it is being built at Lungmen in
Taiwan; Hucik said that Lungmen construc-
tion is serving as a test of building tech-
niques that could be applied at Bellefonte. Hucik said that GE hoped to beat its Au- gust target for the ESBWR application. GE
does not expect to get nal design approval
from the NRC until December 2006, but
Hucik said that the NRC has told GE that a
COL application could be submitted then,
and that it need not wait until the comple- tion of the design certication rulemaking.
GE is already having utilities review the de-
sign, and Hucik says that some of the tough
issues to be addressed in a COL proceeding
have already been taken into account in the
design. The ESBWR has 25 percent fewer
pumps, valves, motors, pipes, and cables
than previous BWRs, thanks to its depen-
dence on natural circulation. Hucik said that
GE is aiming to make possible an ESBWR
project that would go from rst concrete to
fuel loading in 36 months. As for what the reactors acronym actu- ally stands for, he offered four choices for the rst two letters: energy simplied, eco-
nomic solution, expedited schedule, and en-
ergy secure. NEIs efforts Adrian Heymer, director of plant perfor- mance improvement with the Nuclear En-
ergy Institute, covered the industry organi-
zations efforts in support of Nuclear Power
2010. He said that based on developments
thus far, the major issue in ESP delibera-
tions is emergency planning. He believes
that some progress has been made, but there
needs to be an integrated plan, with action
items. One area of uncertainty is whether
the ESP will provide environmental nal-
ity, or if some of its ndings will have to be
revisited during a COL proceeding. Heymer said that NEI is trying to work out exactly what ITAAC will entail and
plans to release a proposed guidance doc-
ument by the end of this year. He noted that
the NRC is also considering a revision to
10 CFR Part 52 that would make the
process clearer. NEI representatives have
met with NRC personnel involved with site
inspection, and Heymer said that they
quickly reached a fair amount of agreement
on what would be needed to get an ITAAC
approved and what points the NRC would
emphasize. On the topic of federal incentives for new reactors, Heymer said that regulated and
unregulated utilities would have different
needs, so a single program might not work
for everyone. He referred to the risk indem-
nification insurance proposed during the
plenary session by DOE Deputy Secretary
Jeffrey Clay Sell as a starting point, say-
ing that NEI appreciates the general con-
cept but thinks it needs further work. August 2005 N U C L E A R N E W S 43 M E E T I N G S Hucik said that GE is aiming
to make possible an ESBWR
project that would go from
rst concrete to fuel loading
in 36 months. Heymer also observed that a nuclear revival
poses infrastructure issues, such as the lead
time for component fabrication if about 40
reactors are built worldwide over the next
10 years. Building the plants John Polcyn, vice president of Bechtel Power Corporation, declared that his firm
wants to build the rst new reactors. He said
that Bechtel is involved in many activities
connected with potential reactor orders, in-
cluding some siting and construction cost
studies for utilities that are not involved with
the consortia. Polcyn said that projects that
are going on right now, such as the restart
preparations at Browns Ferry-1 and the
waste cleanup at Hanford, show that Bech-
tel already has a supply chain in place that
would be capable of reactor construction.
He added that once new reactor designs are
developed in greater detail, Bechtel plans to
offer xed prices on construction. During a long and spirited question-and- answer session, an attendee noted that new
reactors recently ordered in Europe and
Asia are not tied in with the United States
push for standardization. Keuter said that if
the passive-shutdown Generation III+ de-
signs had been fully available when Finland
was taking bids for Olkiluoto-3, they might
have been competitive. Hucik noted that
France will be covering the rst-of-a-kind
costs for the EPRs at Olkiluoto-3 and else-
where, and that the EPR has been designed
chiey to meet the existing European util-
ity requirements documents. In response to a different question, Keuter addressed the concern about infra-
structure adequacy by noting that in the rst
round of reactor construction in the United
States, there had been little (if any) infra-
structure or supply chain in place at the
start, but more than 100 reactors were built
over the next 20 years, and the infrastruc-
ture developed as needed. As he did earlier,
recalling the reaction of the nancial com-
munity to the Pilgrim purchase and suggest-
ing that new reactor orders would get the
same treatment, Keuter projected that his-
tory would repeat itself, and new reactor or-
ders would spur the needed infrastructure
development. Nuclear power in Iran In a session titled The Development of Nuclear Power in Iran: Questions, Perspec-
tives, and Impacts, a distinguished panel of
experts provided a standing-room-only
crowd with fascinating insights into the cur-
rent effort to stop Iran from developing nu-
clear weapons, and, on a wider front, on the
impact of this ongoing crisis on the future of
the nonproliferation regime. The panel in-
cluded people who have been involved in
nonproliferation negotiations over many
years, including those with Iran. The session,
which was chaired by William Sutcliffe, se- nior physicist, retired from Lawrence Liver-
more National Laboratory (LLNL) and now
a consultant on various LLNL projects
through M. H. Chew and Associates, looked
at the current situation and how it might be
resolved. The panel members gave their
thoughts on what can and probably cannot
be done. Sutcliffe asked the panel to consider
some broader questions: How will what is
happening in Iran affect the development of
nuclear power? What may happen to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? Will the
development of nuclear power and technol-
ogy in Iran make nuclear or radiological ter-
rorism more likely? Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director for non- proliferation for the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, wondered why Iran
might want nuclear weapons. Certainly the
North Korean regime sees them as a means
of survival, said Wolfsthal, and even Israel
would seem to consider them an insurance
policy. Given the Iraq war, the U.S. mili-
tary strength in the region, and the military
strength of Israel, Iran could see them as a
deterrent, said Wolfsthal. Irans leaders also have strong do-
mestic political rea-
sons for a nuclear
program. If asked
whether Iran should
be allowed to have a
nuclear power pro-
gram, most Iranians
would say yes, of
course. Iranians feel
they are being pre-
vented from becom- ing an advanced technological state by
sanctions and other means employed by the
United States to isolate the country and
keep it down. And
so, developing an
advanced nuclear
know-how has be-
come a very desir-
able goal for many
Iranians. On the
question of nuclear
weapons, however,
there is not such a
public consensus. Wolfsthal said that he could devise
all kinds of creative
ways to help deal
with most of Irans
concerns without
needing nuclear weapons. But any time
[the U.S. dips its] toe in Iranian political
waters, it backres, he said. This may be an
issue the West must let the Iranians work
out for themselves. Wolfsthal posed the question of how to gauge Irans intentions. Does Iran want
something in return [for abandoning its nu-
clear plans] or not? Or are weapons the end
itself? Is Iran just after nuclear power de- velopment? Is enrichment just a trading
chip? We dont know. And without know-
ing the answers to these questions, the ne-
gotiations will not produce the right results,
he observed. He said that he doubts that the United States can do much more than help on the
margins. In many ways, he said, the battle
with the United States is the last justica-
tion for the Iranian revolution. This means
that it is very difcult for Irans ruling con-
servatives to cut a deal. Wolfsthal put forth several other ques- tions: Can failure be prepared for without ac-
celerating it? By talking about learning to
live with a nuclear Iran, will that become a
self-fulfilling prophecy? Will discussing
this possibility crack the existing united
front? Could Iran be the last nail in the Non-
Proliferation Treatys coffin? If Iran fol-
lows North Korea in going nuclear, will this
mean the end of the nonproliferation proj-
ect, leaving only the conflict resolution
project or the war avoidance project?
The nonproliferation regime has not been
perfect, but it has buttressed the nuclear
power industry, he reminded the ANS au-
dience. Without it, it will be difficult to
maintain optimism about the expansion of
nuclear power. Iran may be the linchpin on
this. Otherwise, a whole new international
system will have to be created. How can anyone inuence the debate?
The more focus put on this issue, said
Wolfsthal, the more it feeds back into Iran-
ian domestic conicts and the harder it will
be for Iranian leaders to move away from
their present course. This is a difcult polit-
ical question, one that Western govern- ments have not been very good at dealing
with. Michael May, professor emeritus of man- agement science and engineering and senior
fellow with the Institute for International
Studies at Stanford University, is one of the
most experienced and prominent people in
the nonproliferation arena. He described a
safeguarded scheme, which he has been de-
veloping with his Stanford colleague, Wolfsthal 44 N U C L E A R N E W S August 2005 Iranians feel they are being prevented from becoming an advanced technological state by sanctions and other means employed by the United States to isolate the country and keep it down. Chaim Braun, for supplying fresh nuclear
fuel to all countries. Their scheme focuses
on strengthening the nonproliferation
regime, not on the Iran problem, where it
might not apply particularly well, May said.
If, however, Iran really wants nuclear tech-
nology for energy purposes rather than mil-
itary, he suggested that this may be the way
forward. May listed Irans known nuclear sites and nuclear activities, including centrifuge en-
richment operations, which are still frozen;
uranium conversion facilities, where some
30 metric tons of UF 4 , as well as some kilo- gram quantities of UF 6 , are stored; and a heavy-water reactor under construction and
a heavy-water production facility. There
have also been laser enrichment experi-
ments in the milligram range, and there are
probably more activities that are not known
about, he said. May also posed a number of questions: Does nuclear energy make sense in
Iran? Although the United States govern-
ment may not think so, May said that this
is a tough question to resolve on behalf of
another country. But, he noted, Iran has the
second largest oil reserves and is sitting on
the largest natural gas reserves in the
world. Does enrichment make sense? As long
as the Iranians have to deal with sanctions
and other supply concerns, they could be-
lieve that an independent enrichment capa-
bility is necessary for their power program.
At the moment, their enrichment operations
are pilot-plant scale, he said. The Iranians
want to develop a production plant, starting
with 3000 centrifuges and building up to
50 000, he said. The problem is that a
weapons program needs much less in the
way of separative work units from an en-
richment plant than does a power program. Can any international supply scheme
solve the problem of Iran? In Mays opin-
ion, a successful outcome of negotiations
will not come soon because of inadequate
economic and security incentives and gen-
eral mistrust; Iran has little reason to trust
international assurances and, no doubt, the
United States has little reason to trust Iran-
ian intentions. Any strategy designed to ensure fuel sup- plies, said May, should support and en-
hance nonproliferation measures, credibly
guarantee fresh fuel, provide credible obli-
gations for spent fuel control and monitor-
ing, and be economically viable and nondis-
criminatory in nature. Lease/take-back is
the preferred option, said May. In fact, this
is close to what the Russians and Iranians
are negotiatingRussia wants compensa-
tion for disposing of the spent fuel, while
the Iranians want credit for the remaining
fissile content. When negotiations are at
that point, he said, you know that it is only
a matter of time before the agreement is
signed. May also commented on the position of Brazil, which is building an enrichment fa-
cility. Unlike Iran, the United States only
wants Brazil to accept detailed inspections
of the facility and accede to the Additional
Protocol. At the moment, Brazil is insisting
that some proprietary aspects of its program
be shielded from inspection. Having Ar-
gentina as a partner in the project should
help. In this respect, he noted, it might help
if the Iranian enrichment program is part-
nered with a European company, but May
doubts this would assuage the fears of the
United States. The Washington perspective Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the State Depart-
ments Bureau of Nonproliferation, pro-
vided a Washington perspective of the Iran-
ian situation, alerting the audience that he
would be following the government script.
The United States, he said, starts from the
rm assessment that Iran is pursuing a clan-
destine program to
make ssile material
for nuclear weapons
and has been doing
so since at least
1985. Despite the in-
ternational spotlight
put on the pro-
gramand the ef-
forts of the interna-
tional community to
stop itIran has not
yet chosen to aban-
don its pursuit of nu-
clear weapons. Irans record of deception and denial
of its program, Fitzpatrick said, has been re-
ported in extensive detail by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
the course of seven written reports and one
oral presentation to the IAEAs board of
governors since 2003. In general, the
agency has reported the following:
1. Iran has pursued secret and ambitious
programs to develop a uranium enrichment
capability since the mid-1980s. It has used
both gas centrifuges and lasers clandes-
tinely to enrich uranium, to up to 15 percent
in the case of its laser program.
2. Iran has undertaken secret uranium con-
version activities since at least the early
1990s; these are aimed at developing the ca-
pability to produce feedstock for its cen-
trifuge program, for experiments with ura-
nium metal, and for construction of a
conversion line designed to make enriched
uranium metal.
3. Iran also conducted experiments separat-
ing plutonium from irradiated uranium tar-
gets and in other experiments produced
polonium-210 by irradiating bismuth.
4. Iran failed to declare to the IAEA its im-
port and use of nuclear material and failed to declare and provide information about lo-
cations where nuclear material was stored
or used. Iran intentionally misinformed the
IAEA about its inventory of nuclear mate-
rial so it could secretly use material that it
had previously told the IAEA was lost in
process.
5. Iran failed on many occasions to facilitate
the implementation of safeguards as evi-
denced by extensive concealment activities. The IAEA continues to investigate vari- ous unresolved questions. These regard the
scope and history of Irans P-2 centrifuge
program, the timing and locations of its pre-
viously undeclared plutonium separation
experiments in the late 1990s, and suspi-
cious experiments involving polonium-210,
which can be used in conjunction with
beryllium as a neutron initiator in some
types of nuclear weapons. Fitzpatrick de-
scribed other discoveries that further indi-
cate that Iran has not declared the full his-
tory and scope of its centrifuge programs. Departing from his official text, Fitz- patrick said that Irans continued failure to
provide full information or access to inspec-
tors after repeated requests has created a
confidence deficit in Irans assertions.
Over the past two years, he said, each time
the IAEAs secretariat has uncovered more
evidence, Iran has backtracked, explaining
that what it had said before was not quite
true but that now it was providing the whole
picture. Well, the whole picture is still not
out there, and there is increasing evidence
of military involvement, he said. So our
assessment of a military plan for nuclear
weapons remains very firm. . . . As the
IAEA inspectors pull more threads, we are
going to get more of this. We are not at the
truth yet. The U.S. view of the EU effort Recently, said Fitzpatrick, the EU-3 (Eu- ropean Union countries France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom) effort to offer
Iran a negotiated diplomatic solution to this
problem has been welcomed by Secretary
of State Condoleeza Rice. We believe that
the EU-3 and others share our view of what
would constitute objective guarantees, August 2005 N U C L E A R N E W S 45 M E E T I N G S Fitzpatrick said that Irans
continued failure to provide
full information or access
to inspectors after repeated
requests has created
a condence decit
in Irans assertions. he said. The EU-3 have offered Iran a range
of incentives, including civil nuclear coop-
eration, political and security assurances,
and economic and trade cooperation. The
bargain to give up its unnecessary and un-
economic pursuit is quite generous, he ob-
served, and there is no need to offer further
incentives. In Washingtons view, said Fitzpatrick, the only acceptable objective guarantee
that Iran has abandoned its weapons pro-
gram is a full veriable cessation and dis-
mantling of all of its sensitive fuel cycle ac-
tivities. Verication would require Iran to
give IAEA inspectors full access to all loca-
tions and officials. Given the almost 20-
year history of Irans clandestine nuclear
activities and the continuing confidence
decit created by its current lack of coop-
eration with the IAEA, only this can give
the United States the assurance it needs, he
said. Despite the full support of the EU-3, Fitz- patrick said that the United States remains
skeptical of Irans commitment to maintain-
ing its suspension over any length of time.
It continues to challenge the terms of the
suspension agreement. If Irans leaders
choose a more destabilizing course and
carry out its threat to resume activities, the
next step is clear: The IAEAs board of
governors must meet immediately and re-
port Iran to the UN Security Council. An Iranians view At the heart of the issue is the domestic situation, explained Hadi Semati, associate
professor of political science on leave from
the faculty of Law and Political Science at
the University of Tehran. Semati, a leading
Iranian political scientist and a frequent
commentator on Iranian affairs on major
news media in the United States and Eu-
rope, is a visiting public policy scholar at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars. The fundamental issue, Semati said, is trust. Iran does not trust the international
community and feels extremely vulnerable
and isolated. One reason for this is the lack
of response after it was known that Iraq
used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq
war. Another issue is the intrusive inspec-
tions by the IAEA that go beyond the re-
quirements of the NPT. Iranians believe
they are being judged guilty without evi-
dence, he said. Semati explained that Iran is a nation still in transition, and that despite what many in
the West believe, decisions are not simply
made by a powerful leadership. The coun-
try has a complicated and sophisticated net-
work of institutions and structures, he said,
and decisions on all issues are subject to
stiff competition among many parties.
There is a mediation process that penetrates
all aspects of life, providing a surprising
level of adaptability, he noted. Furthermore, despite severe legitimacy issues, the gov-
ernment and institutions enjoy a core back-
ing, Semati said, adding that unfortunately,
the coercive appara-
tus of the state still
exists and retains
significant power
and control. Never-
theless, Iran exhibits
a good degree of
durability in the face
of adverse social and
political pressures.
Generally, the state-
society gap has
widened in the face
of mounting conser-
vative backlash. On the nuclear is- sue, however, the re-
verse is true. Any solution, said Semati, has
to ensure Irans sovereignty and indepen-
dence. Increasingly, the public has identi-
fied itself with this issue, along with na-
tional pride and prestige. It nds the current
attitude of the outside world discriminatory,
looking particularly at the treatment of
Brazil and Israel. The public is not inter-
ested in nuclear weapons per se, but any
concessions by the leaders would be con-
ceived as treason, he said. The debate is undertaken in the context of the U.S. threat, said Semati, and is a clash
of visions. Iranians believe that even if they
accede to the EU-3 demands, the United
States will not accept their country as a ma-
jor player, let alone allow it to develop
civilian nuclear power. He stressed that unless there is an agreed upon political framework between the
United States and Iran, in all likelihood, this
issue will not be resolved. As long as the
United States looks at Iran as only a prolif-
eration issue, Semati declared, people will
focus on this issue. He added that Tehran
has a ferocious and vibrant political and
cultural lifevery much like that of Wash-
ington, D.C. Limiting withdrawal from the NPT The involvement in nonproliferation of Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished pro-
fessor of International Policy at the Mon-
terey Institute of International Studies
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, goes
back to the Carter administration. Even
more than the nuclear activities of Iraq and
North Korea, said Scheinmanwho is also
an adjunct professor in the School of For-
eign Service at Georgetown University
the discovery of Irans nuclear program in
2002 called into question the whole non-
proliferation regime. It brought into even
greater prominence the specter of the
breakout scenario that North Korea has
pursued, as well as its involvement in clan-
destine activities. In the past couple of
years, a number of proposals have been put forward to limit the ability of countries to
withdraw from the NPT as North Korea is
doing, while maintaining their nuclear ca- pabilities for military purposes. Two main approaches have dominated discussions on how to control the fuel cy-
cle. One is the restrictive approach, focus-
ing on the restraint or denial of the transfer
of technology; the other is a more collabo-
rative approach, centered on the idea of de-
nationalizing the control of sensitive fuel
cycle activities and bringing them under
some form of multinational or multilateral
arrangement. Recently, President Bush proposed the following three ways to prevent the break-
out scenario: The members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group must refuse to sell enrichment or re-
processing equipment and technology to
any state that does not already possess full-
scale functioning enrichment and repro-
cessing plants. Japan and Brazil immedi-
ately questioned what their status on this
was considered to be. Both countries were
assured that they could import equipment.
Scheinman also suggested that Canada and
Australia may want to develop these tech-
nologies in the future to give added value
to the uranium they produce. The leading nuclear exporters must en-
sure that all states have reliable access to
fuel at reasonable costs so long as they re-
nounce enrichment and reprocessing. By 2005, only states that have signed the
Additional Protocol will be allowed to im-
port equipment for their nuclear programs. Scheinman asked what is different to- day that requires revisiting the strategy for
reconciling civil nuclear energy with non-
proliferation. He listed the following four
factors:
1. The cold war and the discipline that it im-
posed have been displaced by regional po-
litical security agendas. Many states, whose
sense of security is more tenuous than be-
fore, see the prospect for obtaining a nu-
clear deterrent as being attractive. Schein-
man thinks Iran may t here. For others the
aspirations of regional dominance and in-
ternational standing are also motivations. 46 N U C L E A R N E W S August 2005 Iranians believe that even if they accede to the EU-3 demands, the United States will not accept their country as a major player, let alone allow it to develop civilian nuclear power. 2. Over time, the possibility of obtaining
nuclear technology and equipment has in-
creased, in some cases through clandestine
activities. Also, not all states adhere to the
nuclear trade guidelines or exercise effec-
tive control.
3. The IAEA has discovered clandestine ac-
tivities that state parties to the NPT have
conducted. Previously, the challenge was
from countries not party to the NPT; today,
the more serious threat comes from those
under the NPT that follow the breakout sce-
nario.
4. National security and international sta-
bility are threatened by the possibility that
organized transnational groups could attain
access to nuclear materials. The greater the
number of national facilities, the greater is
this risk. These considerations are not amenable to solution by any one strategy alone, be it
strengthened safeguards, counterprolifera-
tion measures, or new institutional arrange-
ments, Scheinman said. Fuel cycle activities With the interest that has been expressed in the U.S. Congress regarding spent nu-
clear fuel storage and reprocessing, a ses-
sion titled Proliferation-Resistant Fuel Cy-
cles explored advanced fuel cycle options
that have intrinsic proliferation-resistant
features. The Department of Energys Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology
is leading the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initia-
tive (AFCI), a program established through a recommendation of the Bush administra-
tions National Energy Policy group in May
2001. The AFCI mission, according to Buzz Savage, the programs director, is to de-
velop fuel cycle technologies that enable re-
covery of the energy value from commer-
cial spent nuclear fuel, reduce the quantity
and radiotoxicity of high-level nuclear
waste bound for geologic disposal, reduce
the inventories of civilian plutonium in the
United States, enable a more effective use of the currently proposed geologic reposi-
tory, and reduce the cost of geologic dis-
posal. The goal, he said, is to develop pro-
liferation-resistant spent fuel treatment,
fuels, and transportation technologies to en-
able a transition from a once-through fuel
cycle to a stable, long-term, environmen-
tally, economically, and politically accept-
able advanced closed fuel cycle. AFCI researchers are investigating ad- vanced separation technologies to recycle
components of spent fuel in the current gen-
eration of light-water reactors, as well as in
those reactors that may be deployed in the
near term, including advanced light-water
reactors and high-temperature gas-cooled
reactors, which are under consideration in
the DOEs Nuclear Power 2010 program.
The AFCI ofce is also researching accel-
erator-driven systems for possible transmu-
tation use in order to reduce the inventory of
actinides that are accumulating in spent
fuel, Savage said. Savage cited an April 2005 report from the American Physical Society (APS) that eval-
uated the fuel cycle from a proliferation-re-
sistance standpoint. The report concluded
that nuclear power cannot be made prolif-
eration-proof, but advised that revitalizing
safeguards research and development would
be the most signicant technical investment
that can enhance proliferation resistance of
nuclear power within the next ve years. The APS report also recommended that the United States, in developing a spent fuel
reprocessing technique, take its time, a
somewhat different tack than the U.S. House Appropria-
tions Committee is
suggesting, said Sav-
age, explaining that
the committee wants
a reprocessing tech-
nology selected by
2007. The commit-
tee, however, does
recommend increas-
ing nancial support
for proliferation-re-
sistance R&D and
improving the tech-
nical support for in-
stitutional measures
for the entire fuel cy-
cle, he said. Regarding inter- national cooperation, Savage said that
France is the United Statess major research
partner in proliferation-resistance work.
We are collaborating with them in the de-
velopment of advanced aqueous and pyro-
processing technology and advanced fuels,
he said. We have plans to irradiate trans-
mutation fuels with a mixture of various
transuranic elements in the Ph

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